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ABSTRACT	  
This	  paper	  will	  discuss	  how	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  embodied,	  abstract	  notions	  such	  as	  pain,	  which	  
is	  multi-­‐modal,	  non-­‐visual	  and	  subjective,	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  communicated	  visually	  using	  model	  
making,	  as	  it	  is	  traditionally	  understood	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  architecture	  and	  design.	  We	  propose	  a	  new	  
methodological	   approach	   to	   research	   where	   Gadamer’s	   understanding	   of	   intersubjective	  
interpretation	   (2004)	   used	   in	   conjunction	   with	   Simulation	   theory	   (Gallese	   and	   Goldman	   1998)	   in	  
embodied	   cognitive	   science,	   provides	   a	   strong	   framework	   in	   which	   to	   formulate	   a	   palette	   of	  
materials	   and	   forms	   to	   visualize	   subjective	   experience.	   This	   novel	   approach	   to	   design	   research	   is	  
currently	   being	   undertaken	   within	   the	   field	   of	   Health	   Sciences	   to	   produce	   metaphorically	  
provocative,	  descriptive	  models	  of	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  people	  with	  Rheumatoid	  Arthritis	  (RA)	  to	  
help	  bridge	  the	  gap	  in	  understanding	  between	  the	  sufferer	  and	  the	  public.	  
This	   paper	   seeks	   to	   engage	   briefly	  with	   two	  questions	   integral	   to	   the	   research	   being	   undertaken;	  
how	   does	   one	   understand	   another’s	   pain,	   and	   how	   can	   one	   conceptualize	   and	   communicate	  
abstract	  notions	  such	  as	  pain	  visually	  using	  material	  and	  form	  as	  language?	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RA	   is	   a	   chronic,	   inflammatory	   disease,	   principally	   affecting	   flexible	   joints	   though	   it	   also	   affects	  
internal	   organs	   and	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   body.	   RA	   is,	   potentially,	   extremely	   painful,	   inducing	  
extraordinary	  fatigue.	  If	  not	  adequately	  treated	  it	  can	  lead	  to	  substantial	  loss	  of	  functioning,	  mobility	  
and	   increased	   mortality.	   Treatment	   and	   coping	   strategies	   rely	   heavily	   on	   understanding	   and	  
communication	   (Arthritis	   research	  UK	  2016;	  NRAS	  2016;	   arthritiscare.org	   2016).	  However,	   despite	  
the	   seriousness	   of	   the	   disease,	   the	   ‘symptoms	   can	   be	   visibly	   subtle,	   making	   it	   difficult	   to	  
understand…	   Too	   often,	   even	   doctors	   doubt	   how	  much	   RA	   patients	   endure’	   Rheumatoid	   Patient	  
Foundation	  (2016,	  p.2).	  By	  increasing	  the	  awareness	  of	  how	  it	  feels	  to	  suffer	  from	  RA	  more	  can	  be	  
put	  in	  place,	  to	  help	  those	  who	  do,	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  disease.	  It	  is	  our	  intention	  to	  produce	  material	  
models	  which	  create	  an	  alternative	  to	  spoken	  word	  or	  text	  as	  a	  direct	  means	  of	  communicating	  the	  
experience	   of	   RA	   to	   others.	   The	   intention	   here	   is	   to	   improve	   understanding	   about	   living	   with	  
Rheumatoid	  Arthritis	   in	  the	  public	  realm	  in	  line	  with	  the	  current	  aspirations	  of	   leading	  RA	  charities	  
and	   organizations.	   In	   improving	   communication	   we	   also	   see	   benefits	   for	   the	   health	   professions	  
(National	  Rheumatoid	  Arthritis	  Society	  2013,	  Arthritiscare.org.uk	  2015Arthritisresearch	  uk.org	  2015,	  
Rheumatoid	  Patient	  Foundation	  2016).	  
Gadamer	  described	   text	  as	  meaning	  which	  had	   ‘undergone	  a	  kind	  of	   self-­‐alienation	   through	  being	  
written	  down’	  (2004,	  p.393)	  and	  it	  was	  the	  transformation	  back	  into	  meaning	  that	  he	  considered	  to	  
be	  hermeneutic.	  The	  approach	  here	  is	  to	  first	  gain	  this	  understanding	  through	  meaning	  found	  within	  
the	   text,	   transcribed	   from	   interviews	   with	   people	   suffering	   from	   RA.	   Then,	   still	   involved	   in	   the	  
dialectic	  movement	   between	   the	   text,	   participant	   and	   ourselves,	   to	   seek	   an	   alternative	  means	   of	  
interpretation,	   models	   that	   convey	   sensory	   experience	   understood	   through	   a	   hermeneutic	  
phenomenological	  process	  rather	  than	  an	  illustration	  of	  a	  subjective	  point	  of	  view.	  	  
One	   significant	   advantage	   of	   using	  material	   (physical)	   models	   over	   digital	   representations	   is	   that	  
they	   are	   a	   much	   richer	   source	   of	   information,	   providing	   not	   just	   three-­‐dimensions	   (form,	   scale,	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texture)	   to	   present	   information	   but	   the	   opportunity	   to	   use	   a	   host	   of	   properties	   from	   the	   sensual	  
world	   with	   historical,	   cultural/semantic	   and	   personal	   memories	   and	   connotations	   (Gibson	   1954;	  
Merleau-­‐Ponty	  2002;	  Dunn	  2005;	  Paradis	  2013).	  Such	  models	  are	  metaphorically	  provocative	  (Lakoff	  
1990;	  Lakoff	  and	  Johnson	  1980,	  1999,	  2008)	  and	  evoke	  an	  emotional	  and	  tactile	  connection	  and	  a	  
more	  embodied,	  multi-­‐modal	  understanding	  (Merleau-­‐Ponty	  2002;	  Seamon	  2010).	  
Gadamer’s	  approach	  to	  aesthetic	  appreciation	  is	  phenomenological	  as	  he	  looks	  for	  art’s	  position	  in	  
our	  experience	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  world;	  it	  is,	  however,	  not	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  types	  of	  
subjective	  pleasure	  that	  one	  can	  derive	  from	  art	  but	  what	  objectively	  informs	  subjective	  awareness	  
(Gadamer,	  2004).	  
According	   to	   Gadamer,	   interpretation	   does	   not	   revolve	   around	   text	   alone,	   but	   also	   involves	   the	  
human	   being	   who	   does	   the	   interpreting	   and	   this	   person’s	   interaction	   with	   the	   world	   (ibid.).	  
Gadamer	   saw	   the	   inherent	   interrelations	  of	   the	  human	  body,	   their	   situation,	   and	   language	   (ibid.).	  
Our	   interactions	   are	   constrained	   by	   the	   structure	   of	   our	   body.	   Our	   bodies	   shape	   every	  
understanding	   that	   we	   have	   of	   our	   environment	   and	   those	   around	   us.	   Our	   thoughts,	   imagining,	  
ambitions	  and	  memories	  are	   integrally	   linked	  to	  the	  world	  around	  us	  and	   it	   therefore	   follows	  that	  
conceptualization	   is	   embodied	   (Lakoff	   and	   Johnson	   1999).	   Our	   situation,	   our	   ‘lifeworld’	   (Husserl	  
1970)	   directly	   reflects	   not	   just	   what	   we	   think	   but	   who	   we	   are.	   Such	   a	   hermeneutic	   concept	   in	  
science	  is	  reflected	  in	  embodied	  cognition.	  
In	   1996,	   the	   biologist,	   neuroscientist	   and	   philosopher,	   Francisco	   Varela	   proposed	   a	   need	   for	   a	  
methodology	  marrying	  “modern	  cognitive	  science	  and	  a	  disciplined	  approach	  to	  human	  experience”	  
(1996,	  p.330).	   In	   seeking	  a	  way	   to	  place	   first	  person	  perspectives	   into	  cognitive	  science,	  where	  he	  
saw	  an	  “intrinsic	  circularity”	  (ibid,	  p.	  347)	  that	  undermined	  the	  validity	  of	  observational	  investigation,	  
Varela	   drew	   on	   Husserl’s	   approach	   to	   phenomenological	   reduction,	   seeing	   the	   empirical	   in	   the	  
essence.	  ‘Neuro-­‐phenomenology’	  (ibid.)	  was	  his	  solution	  to	  empirical	  science’s	  dilemma	  of	  having	  to	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draw	  on	  lived	  experience	  in	  order	  to	  study	  any	  mental	  phenomena,	  attempting	  to	  ground	  subjective	  
consciousness	  in	  an	  objective	  framework.	  
However,	   rather	   than	   applying	   the	   method	   of	   phenomenological	   bracketing	   to	   further	   cognitive	  
understanding,	  the	  approach	  here	  applies	  contemporary,	  embodied	  cognitive	  theory	  to	  further	  the	  
understanding	   of	   interpretation.	   We	   question	   the	   philosophical	   commitment	   to	   the	   concept	   of	  
bracketing,	   the	   suspense	  of	   critical	   judgment	   and	   a	   temporary	   refusal	   of	   critical	   engagement	   that	  
brings	   in	   the	   researcher’s	   own	   assumptions	   and	   experience	   (Spinelli	   2005).	   Although	   seductive	   to	  
science	  as	  a	  rigorous	  method,	  phenomenology	  underplays	  the	  social,	  cultural	  and	  historical	  context	  
integral	   to	  hermeneutic	  understanding	   (Gadamer	  2004)	  and	  situated/embodied	  cognition	   (Shapiro	  
2014).	  
We	  see	  Barsalou’s	  situated	  simulation	  (Barsalou	  1999;	  Barsalou	  et	  al.	  2003),	  Goldman	  and	  Gallese’s	  
mindreading	   (1998)	   and	   Glenberg’s	   sensory	   awareness	   of	   our	   environment,	   (Glenberg	   1997)’	   all	  
drawing	   on	   experiential	   engagement	   with	   the	   world,sitting	   more	   comfortably	   with	   Gadamer’s	  
hermeneutic	   philosophy,	   a	   search	   for	  meaning	   through	   intersubjective	   positioning,	   than	  Husserl’s	  
phenomenology,	  a	  search	  for	  the	  essential/prime	  meaning	  behind	  each	  experience	  of	  the	  world.	  An	  
appreciation	   of	   these	   scientific	   approaches	   to	   understanding	   experience	   and	   meaning-­‐making	  
provides	  new	  perspectives	  for	  research	  of	  lived	  experience	  through	  design	  practice.	  	  
UNDERSTANDING	  ANOTHER’S	  PAIN	  
	  ‘Self-­‐projection’	   (Buckner	   and	   Carroll	   2007),	   or	   transposition	   (Gadamer	   2004),	   the	   mental	   act	   of	  
contemplating	  an	  other’s	  mental	   state,	   relies	  on	  our	   imagination	   contextualizing	  within	   social	   and	  
cultural	   situations	   (Goldman	   and	   Jordan	   2013)	   as	   opposed	   to	   empathy,	   which	   is	   an	   experiential	  
understanding	   rather	   than	   conceptual.	   We	   express	   and	   calculate	   pain	   through	   imagining	   and	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imagery,	  visualizations	  tied	  to	  our	   lived	  experience	  of	  a	  world	   in	  which	  pain	  and	   language	  are	  tied	  
together	  through	  culture	  (Csordas	  1994).	  
Empathetic	  representations	  are	  subjective,	  drawing	  on	  personal	  experience.	  Alternatively,	  by	  using	  
models	  where	  the	  materials	  and	  forms	  are	  translations	  of	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  
research,	   rather	   than	   searching	   for	   subconscious	   comparisons,	   ‘have	   I	   felt	   like	   that?’,	   an	  
understanding,	  in	  Gadamerian	  terms,	  can	  be	  made	  of	  what	  that	  experience	  feels	  like;	  Gadamerian	  in	  
that	   the	   understanding	   is	   a	   new	  perspective	   of	   the	  world	  which	   enables	   critical	   reflection	   on	   our	  
prejudices.	  .	  This	  understanding	  is	  based	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  art	  within	  a	  structure	  of	  play,	  an	  act	  of	  
desubjectification	   put	   forward	   by	   Gadamer	   (2004),	   where	   the	   subject	   is	   able	   to	   question	   and	  
validate	  their	  preconceptions.	  The	  subject	  finds	  understanding	  through	  dialogue	  with	  the	  model	  and	  
meaning	   in	   the	   relation	   of	   this	   to	   previous	   embodied	   experience,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   their	   social,	  
cultural	  and	  historical	  understanding.	  
Phenomenologically	   speaking	  we	   don’t	   normally	   experience	   our	   body	   or	   pain	   as	   objects;	   we	   find	  
ourselves	  ‘in	  pain’	  (Merleau-­‐Ponty	  2002,	  p.	  107;	  Strong	  et	  al.	  2009).	  Pain	  is	  more	  than	  a	  stimulus	  and	  
the	   resulting	   sensory	   perception.	   Pain	   starts	   with	   potential,	   a	   realization,	   leading	   to	   a	  
response/vocalization,	   an	   attempt	   at	   avoidance	   and	   then	   the	   initial	   self-­‐soothing	   and	   continues,	  
lasting	  beyond	  sensory	  perception	  (Melzac,	  1965).	  	  
Culturally	  we	  communicate	  pain	  through	  imagining	  and	  imagery,	  metonymically	  using	  the	  cause	  and	  
effect	  of	  pain	   to	  counter	  balance	   its	   subjective	  and	  poorly	  delineated	  qualities	   (Semino	  2010).	   .	   In	  
assessment	  we	  have	  tendencies	  to	  rely	  on	  scientific	  metaphorical	  systems	  to	  enable	  a	  calculation	  of	  
description	  (Melzack	  1975,	  Gould	  et	  al.	  2001)	  rather	  than	  through	  our	  lived	  experience	  of	  a	  world	  in	  
which	   pain	   is	   suffering.	  When	   discussing	   imagining	   pain,	   our	   own	   or	   others,	   it	   is	   not	  meant	   in	   a	  
derogatory	  sense	  of	  fantasising;	  instead	  it	  is	  using	  creative,	  embodied	  imaging	  to	  express	  a	  believed,	  
if	  unperceivable	  state.	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Goldman	  referred	  to	   this	  as	  enactment	   imagination	   (2006)	  where	  we	   ‘conjure	  up	  what	   it	   is	   like	   to	  
experience	   that	   state...to	   enact	   that	   very	   state’	   (Goldman	   and	   Jordan	   2013,	   p.15).	   Gaut	   and	  
Livingston	   (2003)	   described	   it	   as	   experiential	   imagining.	   Rather	   than	   entertaining	   a	   proposition	  or	  
concept,	   imagining	   with	   a	   ‘distinctive	   experiential	   aspect’	   (ibid.	   p.273)	   entails	   a	   sensorial,	  
phenomenal	  engagement	  by	  imagining	  both	  what	  something	  may	  be	  perceived	  as	  and	  what	  it	  may	  
be	  like	  to	  feel	  that	  something	  or	  how	  that	  something	  could	  make	  one	  feel.	  Gaut	  explained	  that	  it	  is	  
imagery	  that	  gives	  experiential	  imagining	  its	  sensory	  characteristics.	  Imagery	  here	  is	  not	  necessarily	  
a	  mental	   image	   as	   in	   remembering	   or	   in	   perceiving,	   which	   would	   be	   an	   asserted	   thought	   but	   in	  
having	  an	  unasserted	  thought,	  something	  that	  exists	  in	  a	  thought	  context,	  even	  if	  not	  in	  reality	  (ibid.).	  
Simulation	  theory,	  as	  an	  attempted	  interpersonal	  re-­‐enactment	  or	  ‘mind	  reading’	   	  (Goldman	  2006)	  
captures	   this	   idea	   of	   mental	   pretence	   of	   trying	   to	   construct	   in	   oneself	   a	   mental	   state	   that	   isn’t	  
generated	  by	  action	  or	  perception	  (Goldman	  and	  Jordan	  2013).	  
Such	  a	  cognitive	  act,	  however,	  is	  prone	  to	  errors	  where	  the	  mind	  reader’s	  own,	  genuine	  beliefs	  and	  
presumptions	   become	   entangled	   with	   the	   pretend	   states	   they	   put	   forward	   (ibid.).	   If	   we	   try	   to	  
imagine	  ourselves	  being	  in	  the	  painful	  situation	  of	  another	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  avoid	  making	  assumptions	  
as	   to	  what	  we	   think	   it	   should	  be	   like,	  merely	  hypothesizing	  on	  being	   in	  pain.	  These	   fallibilities	  are	  
reduced	  if	  the	  mind	  reader	  is	  provided	  with	  ‘perceptual	  cues’	  as	  the	  imaginative	  act	  becomes	  more	  
grounded	  within	  an	  embodied	  understanding	  (Zaki	  and	  Ochsner	  	  2012;	  Lombardo	  et	  al.	  2010).	  
Perceptual	   cues	   for	  pain	  come	   from	  metaphoric	   relationships,	   such	  as	   thumping	  or	   stabbing	  pains	  
categorized	   in	   linguistics	  as	  PAIN	   IS	  CAUSES	  OF	  PHYSICAL	  DAMAGE1	  (Semino	  2010,	   see	  also	  Scarry	  
1985),	  from	  objects	  such	  as	  needles,	  pins	  or	  sharp	  edges,	  THE	  NATURE	  OF	  AN	  ENTITY	  IS	  ITS	  SHAPE	  
(Grady	  1997),	  or	   from	  potential	  situations	  such	  as	  signs	  of	   future	  pain,	  a	  missing	  manhole	  cover,	  a	  
broken	   ladder	   rung,	   for	   example.	   Cognitive	   and	  neuroscience	  have	   shown	  how	   the	  processes	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  linguistics,	  to	  differentiate	  metaphors	  as	  descriptions	  and	  metaphors	  as	  grouping	  or	  classes	  of	  metaphor	  
the	  latter	  are	  formatted	  as	  capitals	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  text.	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products	   of	   visual	   perception	   and	   visual	   imagery	   have	   a	   substantial	   overlap	   (Kosslyn	   1994),	   that	  
visualizing	  strongly	  resembles	  vision.	  To	  visualize	  something	  is	  to	  construct	  an	  image	  that	  resembles	  
the	  visual	  experience	  you	  would	  undergo	  if	  you	  were	  actually	  seeing	  what	  is	  visualized.	  To	  visualize	  a	  
knife	  is	  to	  create	  a	  mental	  framework	  that	  enacts	  you	  seeing	  the	  knife.	  
In	   ‘Perceptions	  of	  Pain’,	  Padfield	   (Padfield	  et	  al.	  2003)	  used	  this	  approach	  of	   literal	  visualization	  to	  
produce	   photographic	   images	   in	   consultation	   with	   sufferers	   of	   chronic	   pain.	   By	   visualizing	  
metaphorical	   descriptions	   literally	   she	   prompts	   the	   viewer	   to	   mentally	   reconstruct	   the	   chosen	  
scenarios.	  However,	   similarly	   to	   the	  McGill	   Pain	  Questionnaire	   (Melzack	  1978),	  which	   calls	   on	   the	  
sufferer	  to	  adjectively	  categorize	  their	  experience	  linguistically,	  such	  images	  objectify	  pain	  sensation,	  
decontextualizing	  the	  description	  from	  the	  lived	  experience;	  rather	  than	  being	  an	  understanding,	  it	  
is	  an	  empathetic	  response	  mechanism.	  In	  attempting	  to	  understand	  pain	  as	  a	  quantitative	  symptom	  
or	  through	  analogies,	  its	  true	  complexity	  that	  of	  a	  lived	  experience	  is	  lost.	  In	  seeking	  to	  describe	  the	  
experience	  of	  pain	  we	  need	   to	   fall	   back	  on	  metaphor,	   trying	   to	   stimulate	  a	   context	   that	  adjective	  
descriptors	  cannot	  bring.	  
Medical	   image	   references	   to	  pain	   are	   little	  better.	  Metaphorical	   visualizations	  of	  how	  pain	  works,	  
nerves	   in	   terms	   of	   circuitry	   connecting	   the	   world	   to	   our	   internal	   mental	   state	   have	   come	   to	  
dominate	  what	  we	  think	  of	  as	  pain	  (Neilson	  2015).	  
Yet	   the	   cause	   of	   pain	   is	   not	   the	   same	   as	   the	   experience	   of	   pain	   (Couceiro-­‐Bueno	   	  2009;	   Csordas,	  
1994;	  Jackson	  1994).	  To	  visualize	  another’s	  pain	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  context,	  an	  experience	  as	  part	  
of	  the	  lived	  experience	  which	  phenomenological	  understanding	  provides.	  
In	  neuroscience	  such	  an	  act	  is	  called	  ‘self-­‐projection’	  (Buckner	  and	  Carroll	  2007)	  and,	  in	  combination	  
with	  our	  ability	  to	  imagine	  past,	  future	  or	  fictitious	  experiences	  (Frith	  and	  Frith	  2003)	  it	  relies	  on	  our	  
imagination	   contextualizing	   within	   social	   and	   cultural	   situations	   (Goldman	   and	   Jordan	   2013).	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Philosophically	   this	   act	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   transposition;	   to	   be	   able	   to	   see	   the	   world	   from	  
another’s	   point	   of	   view	  with	   the	   acceptance	   that	   this	   view,	   the	   other’s,	   is	   different	   (that	   it	   is	   not	  
one’s	  own)(Gadamer	  2004).	  	  
	  
HOW	  CAN	  ONE	  CONCEPTUALIZE	  AND	  COMMUNICATE	  PERCEPTIONS	  OF	  SUBJECTIVE	  EXPERIENCE	  
USING	  MATERIAL	  AND	  FORM	  AS	  LANGUAGE?	  
Barsalou’s	   Perceptual	   Simulation	   Theory	   (1999)	   claimed	   “the	   processing	   of	   all	   language,	   whether	  
literal	   or	   nonliteral,	   is	   accomplished	   through	   the	   partial	   simulation	   of	   associated	   bodily	   states,	  
actions,	   and	   sensory	   perceptions”	   (El	   Refaie	   2015,	   p.	   64).	   In	   other	   words	   we	   understand,	  
conceptualize,	  by	  simulating	  embodied	  experience	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  concept	  that	  “the	  images	  that	  
image	  metaphors	  apply	  to	  [relate	  to	  acquisitions	  of	  those	  images	  as	  conventions]	  unconsciously	  and	  
automatically	  acquired	  over	  the	  years”	  (Lakoff	  1987,	  p.219)	  
Barsalou	  (1999)	  stated	  that	  when	  we	  act	  or	  engage	  with	  the	  world	  symbols	  are	  activated.	  Symbols	  
here	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   schematic	   neural	   representations	   of	   embodied	   action	   (Barsalou	   1999)	  
rather	  than	  any	  form	  of	  semiosis.	  These	  symbols	  are	  multi-­‐modal	  but	  aren’t	  holistic,	  they	  are	  parts	  
of	  a	  whole	  not	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  whole	  experience	  of	  a	  thing;	  the	  weight	  of	  a	  mug,	  the	  feel	  of	  
porcelain	  against	  the	   lip	  rather	  than	  the	  experience	  of	  having	  a	  cup	  of	  tea.	  The	  collection	  of	  these	  
symbols,	   and	   the	   parts	   of	   the	   whole	   they	   serve,	   develops	   through	   our	   selective	   attention	   to	   an	  
action,	   the	   more	   involved	   our	   usage	   of	   a	   thing	   or	   the	   more	   time	   spent	   in	   a	   situation	   the	   more	  
specific	  the	  symbols	  that	  develop.	  
However,	  Perceptual	  Simulation	  theory	  is	  what	  is	  known	  as	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  cognitive	  theory.	  It	  implies	  
that	   in	   comprehending	   sensory	   input,	   linguistic	   or	   otherwise,	   we	   automatically	   first	   categorize,	  
based	  on	  embodied	  experience,	  and	  then	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  singular.	  As	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  stated,	  when	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we	   try	   ‘to	   seize	   “sensation”...we	   find	   a	   formation	   already	   bound	   up	  with	   a	   larger	  whole,	   already	  
endowed	  with	  a	  meaning’	  (2002,	  p.9).	  In	  this	  way	  our	  experience,	  our	  memory	  informs	  our	  senses.	  
Glenberg	  sees	  the	  purpose	  of	  memory	  to	  enable	  ‘the	  organism	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  its	  environment	  so	  
that	   it	   can	   take	  action	  appropriate	   to	  constraints	   resulting	   from	  the	  physical,	  personal,	   social,	   and	  
cultural	   situations’	   (Glenberg	   1997,	   p.	   41).	  Meaning	   is	   inherent	   within	  material	   because	   the	   true	  
context	  of	  a	  material,	  from	  whence	  it	  gains	  meaning,	  is	  within	  these	  embodied	  and	  situated	  events.	  	  
Material	  is	  like	  language.As	  with	  Gadamer’s	  claim	  that	  we	  are	  born	  into	  language	  (1992)	  we	  are	  also	  
born	  into	  a	  material	  culture.	  It	  is	  more	  flexible	  semiotically,	  but	  as	  an	  interaction	  it	  comes	  before	  our	  
prescribed	  understanding,	  before	  reflection,	  in	  an	  already	  formed	  socio-­‐cultural	  grounding..	  
	  
Recent	  research	  investigating	  how	  designed	  products	  convey	  emotive	  qualities	  (Chang	  and	  Wu	  2007;	  
Van	   Rompay	   and	   Ludden	   2015)	   draws	   on	   anthropomorphism	   (Aggarwal	   and	  Mcgill	   2007;	   Guthrie	  
1993),	   including	   meaning	   portrayal	   through	   action	   and	   movement,	   image	   schemas	   and	   symbolic	  
meaning	   similar	   to	   Arnheim’s	   Gestalt	   theory	   of	   expression	   (1949)	   though	  more	   heavily	   based	   on	  
Conceptual	  Metaphor	  Theory	   (Lakoff	  and	   Johnson	  1980,	  1999).	   It	  also	  mentions	   the	  experience	  of	  
materials	  through	  sense.	  
This	  meaning	   stems	   from	   usage	   over	   time	   or	   ‘habit’	   (Benjamin	   2008),	   reflected	   in	   familiarity	   and	  
expertise,	   age	   and	   gender	   (Karana,	   2009).	   It	   also	   stems	   from	  metaphorical	   connections	   threaded	  
together	   by	   history,	   a	   collective	   memory,	   ‘a	   sediment	   of	   cultural	   values’	   (Manzini	   1986,	   p32).	  
Thiswas	   understood	   by	   Gibson	   (1954)	   as	   cultural	   affordance,	   that	   the	   cultural	   world	   through	   our	  
acquired	  cultural	  skills	  is	  also	  correlative	  with	  our	  body.	  He	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  mailboxes	  “Mailing-­‐
letters	   is	   clearly	   not	   a	   cross-­‐cultural	   phenomenon	   based	   solely	   on	   body	   structure,	   nor	   a	   body	  
structure	   plus	   a	   skill	   all	   normal	   human	   beings	   acquire.	   It	   is	   an	   affordance	   that	   comes	   from	  
experience	  with	  mail	  boxes	  and	  the	  acquisition	  of	  letter-­‐mailing	  skills”	  (Dreyfus	  1996,	  p.2).	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Similar	   to	   Gibson’s	   affordances,	   Glenberg	   considered	   ‘the	   phenomenological	   aspects	   of	  
conceptualization,	  acknowledging	  that	  objects	  inherently	  suggest	  to	  the	  human	  perceiver	  what	  kinds	  
of	  activities	  one	  could	  do	  with	  them’	  (Davis,	  2009).	  Glenberg	  named	  these	  as	  activity	  patterns	  (1997).	  
Activity	   patterns	   develop	   in	   two	   strands,	   automatically	   and	   manually	   attributed.	   Automatically	  
attributed	   activity	   is	   a	   result	   of	   innate	   bodily	   potentials,	   our	   sensory	   embodied	   awareness	   of	   our	  
environment,	  which	  he	  named	   ‘projectable	  properties’	   (ibid.).	  Manually	  attributed	  activity,	  akin	   to	  
Barsalou,	   relies	   on	  mental	   simulation	   and	   is	   goal	   orientated.	   Our	  memory	   is	   used	   to	   recall	   ‘non-­‐
projectable’	  features	  of	  the	  environment	  based	  on	  previous	  encounters	  to	  seek	  out	  the	  best	  course	  
of	  action.	  Glenberg	  proposed	  that	  this	  manual,	  or	  non-­‐projective	  property,	  ‘meshes’	  with	  projective	  
properties	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  conceptualize	  (ibid.).	  
This	   cognitive	   action	   of	   ‘meshing’	   in	   a	   search	   for	   ‘common	   proprioceptive	   qualities’	   (Davis,	   2009)	  
informs	  our	  Being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world;	  if	  our	  action	  of	  desire,	  our	  goal,	  meshes	  with	  the	  objects	  automatic	  
potentials	  then	  that	  object	  is	  seen	  in	  a	  new	  way,	  serving	  our	  need.	  
To	   process	   information	   as	   quickly	   as	   possible,	   Glenberg	   (1997)	   proposed	   that	   we	   subconsciously	  
‘clamp’	   the	   simulations.	   ‘Clamping’	   (ibid.)	   refers	   to	   the	   process	   of	   holding	   on	   to	   only	   the	   most	  
relevant	   perceptual	   symbols/projective	   properties	   relating	   to	   the	   immediate	   environmental	  
situation	  allowing	  almost	  intuitive	  action.	  
However,	  ‘suppression’	  encourages	  a	  more	  open	  mind,	  opening	  up	  a	  simulation	  to	  non-­‐projectable	  
properties,	   symbols	   and	   simulators	   from	   memory,	   outside	   of	   the	   immediate	   environment,	  
questioning	   the	   object	   from	   different	   perspectives,	   looking	   for	   ways	   in	   which	   meaning	   could	   be	  
found	  in	  the	  abstract.	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When	  we	  seek	  to	  interpret	  a	  model	  in	  a	  novel	  way,	  as	  an	  abstract,	  conceptual	  model	  rather	  than	  a	  
copy	   for	   example,	   we	   ‘suppress’	   the	   bottom-­‐up,	   we	   concentrate,	   applying	   a	   conscious	   mental	  
simulation	  in	  a	  search	  for	  different	  affordances	  and	  meaning.	  
	  
CONCLUSION	  
Our	   perceptual	   simulation	   system,	   our	  memory,	   is	   the	   selection,	   discarding	   and	   reshaping	   of	   the	  
elements	  of	  experience	  to	  fit	  our	  current	  interest;	  it	  is	  a	  search	  for	  relevance.	  However,	  although	  it	  is	  
cognitively	   closely	   related,	   it	   isn’t	   a	   conjuring	   up	   of	   mental	   images	   nor	   just	   a	   regurgitation	   of	  
memory	  and	  associations	  (El	  Refaie	  2014).	  In	  conscious	  simulations	  visualization	  is	  a	  very	  important	  
process.	   When	   we	   concentrate,	   when	   temporal	   aspects	   of	   a	   thing	   are	   purposefully	   mentally	  
simulated,	   perception	   becomes	   ‘semiotically	   inclined’	   (Davis,	   2009).	   This	   semiosis	   enables	   a	   shift	  
from	   mono-­‐modal,	   as	   in	   what	   we	   see,	   to	   develop	   into	   a	   multi-­‐modal	   simulation	   of	   what	   we	  
remember	  through	  embodied	  experience.	  
We	   perceive	   materials,	   forms	   and	   images	   as	   a	   combination	   of	   multi	   modal	   symbols	   drawing	   on	  
memory/experience	   and	   cultural	   understanding.	   Our	   perception	   of	   any	   given	   environment	   is	   a	  
combined	  understanding	  of	  each	  and	  all	  its	  parts	  and	  each	  of	  these	  parts	  have	  their	  own	  perceptual	  
symbols	   drawing	   on	   historical	   and	   social	   understanding	   informing	   our	   embodied	   experience.	   In	  
mentally	   proposing	   simulations	   we	   draw	   on	   these	   symbols	   to	   create	   theoretical	   models	   to	  
understand,	   hypothesize	   or	   compare.	  We	   can	  mentally	   manipulate	   the	   way	   in	   which	   objects	   are	  
brought	   together	   to	   create	  new	  simulations,	   to	  abstract	   conceptual	   information	  metaphorically	   to	  
seek	  new	  perspectives,	  new	  experience	  which	  inform	  us	  through	  interpretation.	  
The	  hypothesis	  put	   forward	  here	   is	   that	   this	   is	   the	  way	   in	  which	  we	  should	  approach	  the	  choosing	  
and	   forming	   of	   materials	   in	   model	   making	   in	   order	   to	   make	   the	   unperceivable	   (i.e.:	   emotive	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experience)	   tangible.	  The	  historical	   links	   (narratives,	  object	   recollection,	  etc.),	  metaphors	   (linguistic	  
or	  image)	  and	  gestures,	  brought	  forward	  in	  working	  with	  participants	  in	  research	  are	  contextualized	  
and	  translated	  in	  terms	  of	  material	  symbols	  and	  form	  symbols.	  
The	  images	  shown	  here	  (Figures	  1,	  2	  and	  3)	  are	  taken	  from	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  current	  research	  
undertaken	  with	  brief	  descriptions	  provided	  from	  the	  analysis	  for	  the	  model’s	  appearance.	  The	  
model	  stems	  from	  a	  method	  of	  analysis	  based	  on	  the	  approach	  described	  within	  this	  paper,	  initially	  
an	  interview,	  transcribed	  and	  thematically	  analyzed.	  The	  results	  of	  which	  were	  investigated	  further	  
by	  both	  participant	  and	  researcher	  to	  develop	  metaphorical	  links	  and	  a	  visual	  language.	  It	  was	  
important	  that	  the	  visual	  conceptualization	  was	  clear,	  so	  that	  the	  participant	  found	  relevance	  in	  the	  
analysis’	  findings.	  The	  researcher	  initially	  worked	  with	  metaphorical	  concepts	  and	  image	  schema,	  
used	  and	  understood	  in	  both	  text	  and	  objects,	  as	  the	  bridge	  between	  these	  languages	  (See	  
Richardson	  et	  al.	  2001	  for	  experimental	  evidence	  of	  this,	  drawing	  on	  the	  earlier	  work	  of	  Scheerer	  and	  
Lyons	  1957	  and	  Kohler	  1970).	  
In	  translating	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  text	  into	  material	  and	  form	  it	  was	  accepted	  that	  the	  meaning	  
could	  not	  be	  conveyed	  as	  said.	  Translation	  is	  an	  act	  of	  transposing	  meaning	  through	  interpretation,	  
the	  meaning	  of	  the	  model	  stems	  from	  the	  cultural	  and	  emotive	  connotations	  they	  evoke	  through	  the	  
choice	  of	  materials,	  colour	  and	  they	  way	  in	  which	  these	  are	  formed,	  brought	  together	  and	  relate	  to	  
their	  environment.	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The	   unbalanced	   nature	   of	   the	   overall	   model	   reflects	   the	   participant’s	   feeling	   that	   her	   life	   is	  
constantly	  ‘thrown’	  by	  the	  disease.	  However,	  she	  combats	  this	  through	  a	  state	  of	  ‘perpetual	  motion’	  
and	  unbounded	  energy	  despite	  the	  awareness	  that	  it	  rests	  on	  a	  ‘crumbly	  chalky’	  foundation,	  shown	  
here	   as	   a	   cone,	   the	   tip	   being	   the	   remaining	   point	   of	   contact	   to	   normality	   but	   also	   the	   peaks	   of	  
mountains	   from	   which	   she	   could	   leap	   to	   new	   life	   (in	   reference	   to	   the	   potential	   of	   the	   health	  
professionals	  of	  Switzerland	  providing	  a	  solution	  to	  her	  RA).	  The	  pin	  point	  connection	  of	  the	  base	  to	  
the	   ‘core’	   is	   drawn	   from	   the	   participant’s	   acceptance	   that	   the	   drugs	   she	   takes	   (through	   injection)	  
‘hold	  it	  all	  together’	  but	  also	  highlight	  the	  feelings	  of	  balance	  and	  fragility	  
The	   curved	   lines	   of	   the	   steel	   show	   similarities	   to	   diagrammatic	   dance	   instructions	   referencing	   the	  
participant’s	  analogies	   to	  her	   relationship	   to	  RA	  and	  her	  commitment	   to	  movement	  and	  energy	  as	  
the	  antithesis	  of	  the	  disease.	  The	  ends	  of	  the	  steel	  wires	  are	  formed	  into	  hoops,	  similar	  to	  industrial	  
knitting	   machines	   and	   general	   fixings	   with	   connotations	   of	   further	   attachment,	   usefulness	   and	  
potential.	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Both	   the	   fabric	   (silk	   thread)	   and	   the	   steel	   are	   integral	   to	   the	   overall	   structure	   of	   the	  model.	   The	  
thread’s	  growth	  stems	  from	  the	  underside	  of	  the	  steel	  structure,	  undermining	  and	  ‘tripping	  up’	  the	  
participant.	  
The	  thread	  seems	  woven	  or	  knitted,	  creative	  acts	  referencing	  the	  auto-­‐immune	  understanding	  that	  
the	   participant	   is	   the	   creator	   of	   her	   own	   disease;	   the	   irregularity,	   however,	   evokes	   an	   unknown	  
system,	  like	  a	  microscopic	  organism	  colonizing	  the	  structure.	  
	  
The	   shape	   of	   the	   core	   is	   a	   direct	   reference	   to	   the	   hip	   replacement	   undertaken	   by	   the	   participant	  
which	  she	  saw	  as	  the	  core	  of	  her	  physical	  support,	  a	  success	  allowing	  for	  the	  continuation	  of	  her	  life.	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The	   presentation	   of	   the	   core	   of	   the	  model	   with	   eggshell	   like	   qualities,	   a	   soft	   sheen,	   delicate	   and	  
fragile,	  white	  smoothness	  is	  counterbalanced	  with	  the	  stretch	  marks	  and	  tears	  in	  the	  material	  as	  it	  is	  
formed	   and	   its	   elasticity	   begins	   to	   tire;	   incomplete	   and	   stretched	   the	   suggestion	   is	   one	   of	   both	   a	  
decay	  but	  also	  the	  slow	  growth	  of	  bone	  structure	  (hope)	  forming	  towards	  the	  base	  of	  the	  model.	  
	  
	  
The	  research	  currently	  being	  undertaken,	  from	  which	  the	  images	  above	  are	  taken,	  is	  seeking	  to	  show	  
that	   pain,	   being	   an	   embodied	   experience,	   becomes	   open	   to	   us	   through	  models,	   if	   the	   perceptual	  
cues	  offered	  are	  more	  than	  symbols	  but	  carry	   in	   them	  meaning	  of	   their	  own.	  The	  culturally	  based,	  
metaphorical	  framework	  of	  materials	  and	  form	  provide	  the	  context,	  the	  cultural	  link	  from	  subjective	  
expression	  to	  generic	  communication,	  that	  diagrammatic	  symbols	  can’t	  reference.	  
Even	  though	  the	  Visual	  is	  central	  to	  the	  cultural	  construction	  of	  social	  life	  in	  contemporary	  Western	  
society	   (Rose	   2007)	   and	   cognitive	   research	   has	   shown	   that	   the	   understanding	   of	   language	   is	  
embodied	   and	  modally	   based	  with	   spatial	   connotations	   (Lakoff	   and	   Johnson	   1999,	   Stamenov	   and	  
Gallese	   2002;	   Richardson	   et	   al.	   2001),	   the	   use	   of	   purely	   linguistic	   approaches	   still	   dominate	   our	  
perceptions	  of	  the	  world	  in	  research.	  New,	  more	  creative	  approaches	  are	  being	  sort	  by	  researchers	  
such	  as	   Torres	   and	  Galvin	   (2008)	   to	   avoid	   the	  use	  of	   ‘language	   in	   summative	  ways	   that	   can	  over-­‐
sterilize	  or	  even	  deaden	  the	  aliveness	  of	  the	  shown	  phenomena’	  (569).	  However,	  the	  focus	  here	  still	  
lies	  with	  linguistic	  approaches,	  which	  Root-­‐Bernstein	  saw	  as	  misguided.	  
“Neither	  our	  experience	  of	  nature	  nor	  our	  ability	  to	  think	  about	  it	  are	  limited	  to,	  or	  are	  even	  
mainly	   confined	   to	  verbal	   forms.	  Thoughts	  may,	   in	   fact,	  be	   translated	   into	   language	  only	   for	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communicating	  but	  pictures,	  music,	  and	  other	  nonverbal	  forms	  of	  thought	  also	  communicate	  
and	  can	  be	  manipulated	  logically”	  (1985,	  62).	  
The	   role	   of	   models	   is	   a	   communicative	   one	   (Glanville	   2012).	   Models,	   formulated	   through	   the	  
methodological	   path	   described	   above	   where	   analysis	   is	   understood	   to	   be	   “not	   an	   experimental	  
science	  in	  search	  of	  law,	  but	  an	  interpretative	  one	  in	  search	  of	  meaning”	  (Geertz	  2002,	  p.541),	  can	  
convey	  the	  complexity	  and	  multiplicity	   faithful	   to	   the	  phenomena	  they	  describe	  whilst	   skirting	   the	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